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Abstract: 
This article aims at discussing the role of legal education in spreading 
awareness about gender issues amongst legal operators, judges and public 
administrations and institutions. In particular, the authors investigate the 
methodologies of integration of ‘gender skills’ in legal curricula. 
 
Asking why and in what form sexism is found in legal education, and starting 
from criticisms from the gender perspective, the paper studies the 
inadequacies of legal education with respect to gender from the point of view 
both of the structural limits of common methodologies and of specific 
discriminatory attitudes in present teaching activities, curricula and courses. 
 
Lastly, it attempts to propose some methodological innovations in legal 
education, aimed at opposing the predominant indifference towards 
considering gender as a legal matter. Specially: (1) a cross teaching of gender 
topics in (existing) general courses; (2) the inclusion of gender topics within 
(existing) general courses on fundamental rights; and (3) the growth of 
specific courses on law and gender. 
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 INTRODUCTION  I.
 
The main research question of the paper concerns the understanding 
and discussion of the role of legal education for the promotion of a 
gender awareness amongst legal operators and society as a whole. 
Starting from a description of the unsatisfactory Italian scenario of 
indifference and biases towards gender issues, this essay aims at 
analysing the possible integration of what we call ‘gender skills’ in legal 
programs and curricula. 
 
The Italian context represents for us a case-study, relevant from 
various points of view: first of all it clearly constitutes an example of 
the negative impact that a gender-blind education produces on the 
recognition and implementation of equal opportunities in family, 
society, politics and work. Stereotyping and sexist education from the 
very beginning of a child’s integration into the educational and social 
setting contributes to determining the widespread perception that 
women are of a lower status, shaped through their role within family 
and their function as caregivers. The relationship between a gender-
blind education and the common perception of a feminine lower status 
seems to be double-sided: from one side this kind of education 
represents one of the reasons for women’s lower status, while from the 
other it is one of the many consequences of the lower social status of 
women. 
 
The recent legislative interventions in Italy concerning equal 
opportunities evidence on the one hand the growing awareness of the 
necessity to take measures directed to rebuilding women’s status and 
promote a gender culture; on the other hand the enduring lack of 
political will to implement a long-term plan on gender equality and go 
beyond the traditional approach towards equal opportunities. We can 
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therefore ask where this political and legislative attitude originates and 
whether it influences social perceptions and ideologies. This is the 
‘connecting tissue’ of the work; lawmakers, politicians and 
administrators are strongly influenced by the education they have 
received, and they have chiefly received legal training that instead of 
placing the foundation stones for the promotion of culture and 
behaviour enabling equal opportunities, has instead passed down to 
them an abstract and ‘aseptic’ concept of law and justice. The effect of 
this phenomenon is twofold: firstly, legal actions, norms and rules 
infrequently use a gender perspective as a lens to read and understand 
the social context. Secondly, and as a consequence, the social context 
itself converts this gender-indifferent (and often discriminatory) legal 
language into a general background for values that are to be found at 
all levels of education and training. 
 
Based simply on the importance that we assign to legal education and 
its (even indirect) social and cultural impact, it seems interesting to 
compare the Italian scenario of legal education with the American 
scenario and more generally the common law approach to legal 
education. This is because such a comparison will allow us to 
investigate whether and how the integration of gender in legal 
education could follow the same methods and contain the same 
content in the two different scenarios. 
 
The research takes the following structure in order to pursue these 
objectives. In Section 2, we try to answer the question of whether 
gender matters in Italy; in Section 3 we analyse the role of the Italian 
lawmakers in strengthening gender biases through legal norms, 
studying briefly the most significant statutes adopted (during the last 
legislature) in some fields variously linked with across-the-board 
gender issues. In Section 4, we investigate why and how sexism 
characterises legal education, starting from criticisms of legal 
education from the gender perspective. We study the inadequacies of 
legal education with respect to gender, from the point of view both of 
the structural limits of common methodologies and of specific 
discriminatory attitudes in present teaching activities, curricula and 
courses. Finally, we propose some methodological innovations in legal 
education that could improve the situation. 
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 GENDER BIAS AND THE LAW IN ITALY II.
 
 Does gender matter in Italy? 1.
 
Jurists and legal scholars are generally indifferent towards the issue of 
equal opportunities for men and women; a very small number among 
them deal with gender issues, and almost all the scholars engaged with 
these issues are women. The methods that characterise the approach to 
gender issues are also significant: very often topics concerning gender 
are taken into consideration separately and autonomously, as if they 
were distinct fields of study, and gender issues are not included at all 
in legal reflections when teaching topics where a gender perspective is, 
strictly, relevant.1 
 
For instance, in scientific and academic meetings or seminars on the 
electoral system (which are very common nowadays in Italy), it does 
not often happen that speakers discuss the mechanisms that can assure 
equal opportunities in order to promote the political participation of 
women. Their main aim is to enforce the accountability of the 
government and its centrality within the institutional system, through 
electoral mechanisms that, without modifying the text of the 
Constitution, assign to the winner of the political competition a large 
number of seats, using a first-past-the-post system (with proportional 
correctives) or single-member constituencies. 
                                                            
1 A significant example comes from the reading of the main handbooks of legal 
disciplines in the Italian academic context: they never take into consideration 
gender as a general point of view by which investigate norms, cases and build a 
theoretical framework. Constitutional Law, Private Law, Criminal Law, Social Law 
and Labor Law, are all explained and taught without any reference to the gender 
perspective. Many are the question that academic handbooks do not pose, and we 
can find only sporadically in articles and monographs that facially deal with gender 
issues and topics. For instance: how much the social and political status of women 
affected the evolution of political representation in the Italian institutional system? 
In which way the constitutional protection of civil and social rights and liberties has 
had an effect on women and their role? Have family law and all the rules concerning 
marriage, children and relationships within the familiar context influenced and 
been influenced by the social perception of women? Does criminal law dedicate a 
specific attention to ‘gender crimes’? And what kind of impact could have on the 
criminal system the present incorporation of peoples and groups that ground their 
legal system of values on the consideration of a lower juridical and social status for 
women? To what extent will the reform of the labor market and the social security 
contribute to a general reassessment of women’s role and could it produce some 
discriminations? 
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Irrespective of the choices and the preferences expressed, the question 
of the need to establish anti-discriminatory measures in order to 
guarantee an equal presence of men and women within the electoral 
lists (in the case of multiple-members constituencies), or an equal 
number of candidates of each sex (in single-member constituencies), 
has in any case a secondary (or low) relevance. This lack of relevance 
remains even though in very recent years some interesting provisions 
have been adopted to promote gender equality and the courts have 
gradually started to change their point of view. 
 
Here, we can refer to Law l. n. 120/2011, containing provisions that 
establish penalties (such as the dissolution of the governing body of a 
listed corporation) for discrimination and to various anti-
discriminatory measures for the governance of local authorities 
(provisions concerning local electoral systems such as the ‘double 
gender preference’ and some others regarding the composition of local 
government bodies). 
 
The administrative tribunals have developed some strong principles in 
their decisions to disband local authorities whose members were all of 
the same sex or which were evidently gender unbalanced. These 
tribunals have said that: 
 
governmental bodies when unbalanced in gender representation 
underline a lack in democratic representation of the heterogeneous 
composition of social background and electoral body […] they are 
potentially not fully functional lacking the contribution of the gender 
that is not adequately represented.2  
 
The Italian Constitutional Court3 has affirmed that Article 51 of the 
Italian Constitution (as modified in 2003) requires, as right and proper, 
actions to be taken that are directed at guaranteeing equal access to 
elections. Evaluating the ‘double gender preference’ 4 , the 
Constitutional Court has affirmed that this mechanism is coherent with 
the goal of the effective and concrete implementation of the equality 
principle, which has not yet been fully implemented in political and 
                                                            
2 TAR Lazio, n. 6673/2011, and TAR Lazio n. 633/2013, where the threshold of 40% is 
setas the minimum presence of each sex in local government bodies. 
3 Constitutional Court decision n. 49/2003. 
4 Constitutional Court decision n. 4/2010. 
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electoral behaviour and procedures. Finally, decision n 81/2012 
explicitly declares that a requirement for gender balancing that is 
established by the law (the law at issue was the Regional Statute of 
Campania) must be in harmony with the Constitution. 
 
In spite of these significant steps, the prevalence of indifference as the 
main attitude towards gender issues is demonstrated by numerous 
examples that are slowly coming to light after recent political and 
institutional events. We can mention for example the documents 
produced by the Committee of Experts nominated by Prime Minister 
Enrico Letta in 2013 to give details about a proposal to reform the 
Second Part of the Constitution. Reading the preparatory works, it is 
possible to verify the marginal role assigned to gender issues in the 
representation, participation and composition of institutional bodies.5 
We can also find something in the recent Bill adopted by the Senate in 
order to significantly modify the Constitution, and in particular the 
parliamentary system (although this may require further readings 
before entering into force): therein, Article 1, amending Article 55 of 
the Italian Constitution establishes that statutes containing the 
electoral system for Parliament will promote the balance between men 
and women in their representation. This weak provision joins on to 
Article 51 that declares the equal opportunities between men and 
women in the access to the public offices, even elective, and gives to 
the Republic the task to promote equal opportunities between men 
and women. The more recent events concerning the adoption by 
Parliament of the new system for election to the Chamber of 
Representatives clearly demonstrates the (guilty) indifference towards 
the inclusion of anti-discriminatory provisions in a text that directly 
affects the level of political participation of women and their presence 
in the higher political institutions. 
 
                                                            
5In the final report (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Italian Government, ‘Per 
una Democrazia Migliore’ [2013], 70), we find only few words concerning gender 
issues, regarding in particular the electoral system, where the Commission proposes: 
(1) in case of choosing a proportional system, to provide a ‘double gender 
preference’; and (2) in case of choosing a majority system, a gender provision on the 
‘gender balance’ (32). These are the only references in the written report, although 
many other and significant proposals had been supported by the women within the 
Commission during the preparatory works (one of the authors of this paper, 
Elisabetta Catelani, was member of the Commission). 
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Despite the opposition of women in Parliament, who in symbolic ways 
also displayed their aversion to the unsuitable (and wrongful) decision 
not to include in the statute anti-discriminatory norms and percentages 
of women to be included in the lists of candidates by the political 
parties, the bill sent to the Senate does not contain any provisions on 
equal opportunities. 
 
Furthermore, the general content of the statute would damage not only 
the democratic representation as a whole, but also the empowerment 
of merit and gender competences: there are to be closed lists, without 
preferential voting, and no provisions for binding or compulsory 
primary elections for the selection of candidates. 
 
From this background, the main question that arises is: what are the 
causes of this indifference and, as is often the case, intolerance towards 
gender issues? How can legal education represent an instrument for 
settling these issues in society and public debate and awareness? 
 
 The role of lawmakers in reinforcing gender bias 2.
 
In this section, before focusing on the issue of sexism in education and 
the role of gender issues in legal education, we will discuss the role of 
lawmakers in strengthening certain gender biases through legal norms, 
and we will identify and understand gender biases, considering how 
and to what extent they influence the general approach towards gender 
issues in the social and public environment. We have chosen to start 
from the point of view of the lawmaker because we believe that this 
strongly influences social behaviours and perceptions and, establishing 
norms and rules, also builds the grounds for the interpretative activity 
of the judiciary. Moreover, the relationship between legal education 
and the role of the lawmaker emerges even from the factual verification 
that a significant portion of lawmakers is represented by people with 
legal curricula of studies.  
 
To analyse this we will take into consideration the Italian State statutes 
adopted in the XVI and XVII legislatures.  
 
The investigation of the legal provisions will be conducted according 
to a list of indicators, including: (a) the use of gender-related 
stereotypes and preconceptions; (b) the assumption of the immutability 
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of gender identity; (c) the media relevance of the particular statute; and 
(d) the inclusion of positive actions for the promotion of equal 
opportunities in the field of the statute. 
 
 Social care, pension law, insurances, social benefits a.
This field is very relevant in Italy when looking at sexual discrimination 
imposed by the law. The European Commission has just opened an 
infringement procedure against Italy concerning the norm that 
establishes a gap between men and women in the pension 
contributions that they need to have deposited in order to take early 
retirement. 
 
In 2010, the European Commission began a dispute with Italy that was 
grounded on the specific regulation for public employment. At that 
time, the Italian Government faced the question of adopting legislative 
reform that shifted the retirement age for women to 65 years.  
 
The decision of the CJEU of the 18th of November 2010 in Case C-
356/096 underlined the fact that a public employer was able to dismiss 
an employee who had reached retirement age in order to promote the 
professional inclusion of younger personnel: this condition would give 
an advantage of five years to women, who would reach retirement age 
before men. 
 
The recent infringement procedure7 is directed towards law n. 214/2011 
(Article 24 of the governmental decree n 201/2011, which was ratified by 
Parliament with amendments), that establishes a different minimum 
number of years of contributions for men and women to take early 
retirement. Recent proposals made by the Italian Government led by 
Matteo Renzi would neutralise the gap, but for the moment it is 
interesting to analyse the statute with respect to two of the four 
parameters listed above: a. the use of gender-related stereotypes and 
preconceptions; and d. the inclusion of positive actions for the 
promotion of equal opportunities in the field of the statute adopted. 
 
                                                            
6 Case C-356/09 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Kleist [2010] ECR I-11939. 
7 We refer to the procedure n. 2013/4199, challenged by the European Commission 
because of the incompatibility with Article 157 of the Treaty which establishes that 
the wage for workers will be equal for men and women, and Directive 2006/54/CE 
(Articles 5, 7 and 14). These last provisions provide that the access to retirement 
pensions cannot depend on the sex of the worker. 
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Concerning point (a), we could say that a gender-related stereotype and 
social preconception is at the basis of this statute. Indeed, the different 
conditions for (early) retirement (there is a more general differentiation 
between men and women in policies on retirement taken as a whole) 
assume that men and women have a different status; there is no 
immediate ‘biological’ cause for this and, indeed, if we remember that 
on average women live for longer than men, that would lead to exactly 
the opposite solution to the issue. This preconception considers the 
different role of women in care-giving activities and, above all, their 
exclusive (or, at least, dominant) role in assisting the elderly: the 
scenario that is assumed is that a woman leaves work, retires, and starts 
to assist her parents. Unfortunately this scenario corresponds to a real 
social context, and the stereotype has become a protective habit for 
women, who often have no choice because of the serious lack of public 
social services and support in managing vulnerable people such as the 
elderly and children. 
 
In many other European countries, a differentiation between men and 
women in terms of retirement age can be evaluated as unreasonable 
discrimination that apparently (and maybe concretely) worked in 
favour of women, but was largely able to stereotype them in their social 
and familial role.  
 
Moving to point (d), in Italy the provision could be interpreted as a 
reasonable discrimination the function of which was to allow a better 
balance between work and familial engagement. In fact, this is not an 
ordinary way to reach a balance, because in this case the woman's work 
stops and the greatest weight is assigned to the familial/social role. For 
the same reasons, the provision cannot be considered as an affirmative 
action: the legislative intervention does not introduce a policy of 
providing special opportunities for women, favouring them, or of 
allowing them to do or participate in something, to be represented 
(quotas), or to be preferred and incentivised to realise an initiative. 
 
 Fundamental rights and freedoms b.
In this field we can take into consideration law n. 119/2013 regarding 
‘Gender Violence’, which was adopted after the ratification and 
execution of the Convention of Istanbul of the 11th of May 2011, under 
law n. 77/2013. This statute contains the ratification of the 
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governmental decree on the criminalisation of domestic abuse, sexual 
assault, and stalking. 
 
First of all, punishments for all crimes are increased when the 
offender's behaviour is directed at his or her spouse, even if they are 
separated or divorced, or at his or her partner. Secondly, some 
provisions have been introduced regarding stalking. The offence of 
stalking has been widened to include aggravating circumstances, acts 
perpetrated against the offender's spouse, and every kind of act 
committed using information and communication technologies; 
moreover, law n. 119/2013 establishes that the charge of stalking in the 
case of ‘serious and continual threats’ (for instance made by the use of 
weapons) cannot be withdrawn. 
 
Particular attention should be paid to this last provision, because in 
the first version of the decree there was no possibility of the charge 
being withdrawn, while now it is possible for this to be done except in 
cases in which the threats are repeated. The Supreme Court of 
Cassation has expressed some doubt about introducing this 
modification by a ratifying parliamentary statute, even if it is 
established that the withdrawal of the charge is merely procedural. The 
rule means that the judge will effectively have to assess whether the 
withdrawal is voluntary, but withdrawal by the judicial police or special 
lawyer would be accepted: the rationale for the rule is to prevent illegal 
influence being used on the victim, and this is strongly supported by 
the Court of Cassation, which considers the definitive provision 
adopted by the lawmaker to be inadequate.8 
 
Using the indicators set out above, we can underline some relevant 
features: 
 
                                                            
8 The Court of Cassation also decided that the redefinition of stalking is a positive 
step (Court of Cassation, Massimario Office, Report on law n. 119/2013, 16.10.2013): 
until this statute was passed, law n. 11/2009 restricted the crime to offences by a 
separated or divorced spouse or the former partner of the victim, whilst now the 
only requirement for the crime of stalking is an emotional bond between the stalker 
and the victim. Many scholars (T Padovani, ‘Quel Collasso dei Codici ‘Figlio della 
Rincorsa’ all’ultima Emergenza’ in Guida al Diritto (2013), 36) have criticised the 
vagueness of this notion, and the risks of vagueness in criminal law are well-known, 
but we will come back to this point in our analysis under the parameter c). 
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With regards to (a) (use of gender-related stereotypes and 
preconceptions) this legal instrument has a clear symbolic meaning, 
which is simply to break down the cultural stereotypes that have for 
many years allowed men to make women subordinate, using the 
discriminatory instrument of jus corrigendi. In this paper we do not aim 
to investigate the extent to which the symbolic and performative use of 
criminal law is compatible with the constitutional role of punishment 
and the protection of fundamental rights. However, we need to 
underline how the performative intention of the norm is, in this case, 
aimed at destroying the mechanisms of women's subordination. It is 
significant that in no part of the law is there introduced an express 
distinction between men and women in the application of the criminal 
descriptions, although it is clear that the legislative intent was to fight 
against the dramatic phenomenon of gender violence. Indeed, the term 
‘femminicidio’ has been created in order to represent not only the fact 
that the victim of this kind of crime is always a woman, but also (and 
above all) that the crime is ‘gender violence’, because it is committed 
by a partner or former partner. The word ‘femminicidio’ has only 
existed in Italian since 20019 and the use of the word has spread since 
2008. 10  The term, created by Diana Russel and spread by Marcela 
Lagarde, means ‘the murder of a woman because she is a woman’, and 
has recently also been used in the  case law of the Court of Cassation 
(Sez V, 9th April 2013, n 34016). 
 
With respect to this point, the assumption of the immutability of 
gender identity (b) comes more from the public interpretation of the 
statute than from the statute itself. Indeed, an explicit exclusive 
reference in the statute to acts committed by men against women could 
have constituted a violation of the equality principle of Article 3 of the 
Constitution, given the strict boundaries of criminal law. From this 
point of view, the statute implicitly presupposes that it will apply 
largely or wholly to crimes against women, but it does not assume the 
immutability of gender identity, because it is directed against gender 
violence in total, as a form of violence that takes place against a person 
on the basis of gender.11  
                                                            
9 V Della Valle,’Femminicidio’, Enciclopedia Treccani (Treccani 2013) 
10  B Spinelli, Femminicidio. Dalla Denuncia Sociale al Riconoscimento Giuridico 
Internazionale (Franco Angeli 2008) 
11  Gender-based violence and violence against women are often used 
interchangeably because most gender-based violence is inflicted by men on women 
and girls (European Institute on Gender Equality). It is estimated that 20 to 25% of 
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European law has been moving in the direction of countering gender-
based violence, through the Resolution of the European Parliament 
adopted on the 26th of November 2009 on the elimination of violence 
against women, and then with the Directives 2011/99/EU and 
2012/29/EU.12 The first of these introduces the European protection 
order and the second establishes minimum standards for the rights, 
support and protection of the victims of crime. The relevance of these 
acts lies in how they improve the legislation of Member States to 
counter all kinds of violence against women and to enforce all types of 
judgment and judicial decisions. 
 
Finally, these Directives are included in a coherent and comprehensive 
set of measures on victims’ rights that are particularly directed at 
protecting victims of gender crimes. In any case, in the approach to 
gender violence, gender construction prevails with respect to sexual 
identity in itself: the moral and psychological dimension is relevant in 
the definition of the conduct ascribed to gender violence. 
 
With regards to (c) (the media relevance of the statute), we can say that 
it has had a strong presence throughout the media; the problem is the 
kind of interpretation that is given to the word ‘femminicidio’. There is 
a sort of social trend that sees ‘femminicidio’ and violence against 
women as inexplicable events. 13  Why would an apparently compos 
mentis man kill the woman that he loves? Why would a young boy 
decide to imprison his girlfriend and submit her to continual abuses 
for three whole days? What reason leads a rich and powerful politician 
to attempt to carry out a rape? The media usually explains violent or 
murderous actions taken by men in various ways: asserting that too 
intense a feeling can produce such strong pain that it may lead to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
women in Europe have suffered physical violence, and that the number of women 
who have suffered other forms of gender-based violence is much higher. 
12 Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on the 26th of November 2009 on 
the elimination of violence against women [2010] OJ C285/53; Directive 2011/99/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the 
European protection order establishing a mechanism for the mutual recognition of 
protection measures in criminal matters between Member States [2011] OJ L388/2; 
Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA [2012] 
OJ L315/57. 
13 L Lipperini, M Murgia, L’ho Uccisa Perché l’Amavo. Falso! (Laterza 2013) 
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violence; holding that pain and suffering can be strong enough to ‘alter’ 
love and drive a man to violence; or affirming that the male sex drive 
can be so strong that it results in physical violence towards a woman. 
 
Recently, it has been underlined that very few media reports assert that 
gender violence and ‘femminicidio’ are not the possible results of a 
‘distorted’ love, but rather are the outcome of a cultural heritage that 
assigns a socially subordinated role to women, a role that even includes 
submission or physical elimination when a woman moves away from 
the social paradigm designed for her.14 
 
The lawmakers have to take this social background into consideration, 
and laws can contribute to its reinforcement or weakening, through the 
creation of new paradigms of values and roles within society and family. 
The statute concerning ‘femminicidio’ tries to do this, but the use of 
the criminal law to further cultural and social goals has attracted much 
criticism, criticism that emphasises the (wrongful and hypocritical) idea 
that the law cannot be used to achieve equality between men and 
women. 
 
The main feature in this field is that gender crimes do not have the 
same characteristics as other violent crimes: crimes against women can 
and should be considered separately because of their intrinsic 
particularity. This is just what is being done with the roadmap of 
European directives that try to harmonise the criminal law in the 
Member States by calling on them to improve their national laws and 
policies to combat all forms of violence against women, and to act to 
tackle the causes of violence against women, not least by employing 
preventive measures, and by calling on the EU to guarantee the right to 
assistance and support for all victims of violence. 
 
 Political participation c.
In this field some important norms were adopted in 2012. The law n. 
215/2012 introduces three categories of provisions to the Italian legal 
system that can all be included in the legal phenomenon of affirmative 
action. 
 
                                                            
14 F Pischedda, La Violenza Contro le Donne e il Sessismo Implicito nel Discorso 
Giornalistico Scritto, Master Thesis dissertation, University of Bologna, 2013. 
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The first field of norms concerns the affirmative action that is required 
in order to promote an equal presence in all local political 
representative bodies, and also in other bodies called to assume 
relevant political and administrative decisions. 
 
With respect to this first intervention, the statute modifies the 
provision of the code of local authorities - legislative decree n. 
267/2000 - by establishing that the statutes of municipalities must 
include rules that guarantee the presence of both sexes in local 
government bodies and all non-elected collective bodies. 
 
The second field of norms concerns elections, electoral systems and 
general principles. It requires that in municipal elections the lists must 
contain candidates of both sexes, and that not more than two thirds of 
the candidates can belong to the same sex. Every voter can express one 
or two preferences for a candidate on the list linked to the mayoral 
candidate: if the voter expresses two preferences, the second must be 
for a candidate of the different sex, otherwise the second preference is 
cancelled.  
 
Moreover, the statute adds to Article 4 of law n. 165/2004 (providing 
principles that the regions should follow in setting up their electoral 
systems) a paragraph c-bis that introduces the objective of promoting 
the equality of men and women in access to political offices, through 
the provision of measures that allow the access of the under-
represented gender in electoral offices to be prioritised. With regards 
to the general provisions concerning elections and, in particular, 
electoral campaigns, the statute adds to law n. 28/2000 a regulation 
establishing that when the media publish political communications, 
they have to act in compliance with Article 51 of the Constitution 
concerning the equal opportunities of women and men. 
 
The third and last field is represented by Article 57, which modifies 
Article 61 of the legislative decree n. 9/1993 concerning public 
employment and establishes (amongst other provisions on equal 
opportunities for access and treatment at work) that public 
administrations must, except in the case of justified impossibility, 
appoint women to at least one third of the positions on examination 
boards. The nomination to the boards is overseen by the ‘Consigliera 
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di parità’, who can order the administration to remove the board when 
this rule has not been respected. 
 
Recently, in April 2014, the Italian Parliament introduced quotas in the 
electoral system for the election of the Italian members of the 
European Parliament. From 2019, each list of candidates must contain 
no more than 50% of members of either sex, and the first two 
candidates must be of different sexes. The circuit election office will 
control compliance with this provision by the lists, and if more than 50% 
of the candidates on a list are of the same sex the office will reduce the 
list by cancelling the names of those candidates belonging to the most 
represented sex. Parliament also adopted a temporary measure for the 
next European elections to be held in May 2014: if a voter states three 
preferences (the number of votes is proportional to the preferences), 
both sexes shall be represented in the choices and a third same sex 
preference shall be invalid. 
 
This legislative intervention represents an affirmative action: it should 
constitute the direct precedent for a more effective provision regarding 
the national electoral system and the composition of national 
governmental bodies. On the contrary, the important steps taken for 
local bodies, and the choices made for the European Parliament, do 
not correspond to an engagement by the lawmakers with guaranteeing 
equal opportunities and access to national representative organs. The 
(free) choice made by the current Prime Minister to compose his 
cabinet of an equal number of men and women seems to be of little 
importance, because it is evident that the relevance of the roles 
assigned to the women are actually inferior to those roles assigned to 
their male colleagues.15 
 
 SEXISM AND LEGAL EDUCATION III.
 
In this paragraph we will investigate why and how sexism is found in 
legal education, starting from criticisms of legal education from the 
gender perspective. We will study the inadequacies of legal education 
                                                            
15 Seven are the women ministers: three among them are ‘without portfolio’ and two 
are charged with the traditional ‘feminine’ sectors, such as Education and Health. 
Only two women lead ‘hard fields’ (using of course an usual as arguable distinction): 
Economic Development and Defense. Nine are men, and all Ministers with portfolio. 
There are no women among the undersecretaries at the Government: four positions 
and four men. 
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with respect to gender, from the point of view both of the structural 
limits of common methodologies and of specific discriminatory 
attitudes in present teaching activities, curricula and courses. The 
grounds for all cultural education are definitely sexist, and recent 
studies have also underlined how the majority of books written for 
young girls and boys at primary school contain significant gender 
stereotypes.16 
 
Sexism is a term that came into use in the sixties and seventies in the 
cultural field of American neo-feminism, and was inspired by the term 
‘racism’. It describes an arbitrary stereotyping of males and females 
based merely on the sex to which they belong. 
 
Generally, investigations into the phenomenon of sexism focus on 
features of language, from two points of view: (i) the problem of how 
language is used to speak about women (the use of language); and (ii) 
the problem of what the linguistic system makes available to use when 
referring to women in discourse (by which we mean the 
morphosyntactic characters). In a wider sense - the sense that directly 
concerns our topic - linguistic sexism takes into consideration the 
image of women that emerges from linguistic practice and the 
increasingly evident contrast between the social achievement of women 
and the rigidity of a language built by and for men.17 
 
 Which methodological innovations in legal education to go 1.
beyond sexism? 
The relationship between sexism and education ought to be 
considered from the specific perspective of legal education. Over 
recent years, a wide-ranging investigation has been of interest in the 
field of education, for two main reasons: the reform of academic 
curricula has, since the beginning of this century, imposed a new 
method of teaching law (caused by the shorter times available for 
lessons and courses), and new technologies have simplified but also 
modified teaching methodologies and communication between 
teachers and students. 
 
                                                            
16 I Biemmi, Educazione Sessista. Stereotipi di Genere nei Libri delle Elementari (Torino: 
Rosenberg & Sellier 2010) 
17 C Robustelli, ‘Lingua e Identità di Genere. Problemi Attuali nell’Italiano’, in Studi 
Italiani di Linguistica Teorica e Applicata (2000). 
2014]   Equal Opportunities and Legal Education   196 
 
In Italy, two teams of scholars have studied these features. One of 
these is the group led by Orlando Roselli who has published a large 
number of books regarding legal education. 18  to having passed the 
exam in Family Law Reading these works, we find some up-to-date 
thoughts on the education of jurists that can be divided into three 
sections: (a) the role of the historical perspective in legal education; (b) 
the indivisibility of the legal sciences; and (c) the alternatives to the 
empirical approach and the theoretical approach. These three aspects 
will be summarised, and it will become apparent that the total absence 
of a gender perspective from these studies corresponds to a strong 
correlation between them and the need to integrate gender into legal 
education. 
 
(a) With regards to the role of the historical perspective in legal 
education, we can start from the statement of Paolo Grossi, who wrote 
that the real jurist is not a mere technician of law, but is able to 
collocate the legal phenomenon, in its very nature as a social science, 
all along its historical evolution, using the past in order to understand 
the present and the possible future developments.19 
 
This teaching is greatly neglected by our legal educational system, 
where the teaching of ‘History of Law’ is definitively distinguished 
from the teaching of substantial law.20 In the following pages we will 
underline the extent to which the historical perspective is basic to the 
‘genderisation’ of education, in terms of the necessity of rethink legal 
history and the role of law in its historical evolution in producing 
cultural and social norms. 
 
(b) The differences that exist between the various legal disciplines, and, 
consequently, between the different approaches to teaching them, 
should not obscure the unitary nature of legal science. All legal 
teaching should aim for this objective and should sacrifice at least 
some of the sectorial approach in order to promote the unitary matrix 
                                                            
18 O Roselli, Scritti per una Scienza della Formazione Giuridica (Napoli: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane 2012).  
19 P Grossi focused on this issue in various works, especially in ‘La Formazione del 
Giurista e l’Esigenza di un Odierno Ripensamento Metodologico; in V Cerulli Irelli 
and O Roselli (eds), La Riforma degli Studi Giuridici (Edizioni scientifiche Italiane 
2005), 31, and P Grossi, Prima Lezione di Diritto (Laterza 2003). 
20 This is different from what happens in Germany, where history is an essential part 
of legal education as a whole (ibid). 
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of all the legal fields. It is evident that, in this context, gender 
mainstreaming could find a clear realisation because the deepening of 
gender issues would pass through all the possible legal scenarios and 
affect the various articulations of laws and rights. 
(c) The controversy between the empirical and the theoretical 21 
approach is long-standing, and maybe unsolvable. We should 
emphasise the need to build on an exclusively theoretical legal training 
(typical of the civil law systems) by integrating this into a practical 
context of the evaluation of concrete cases, trying to make students 
understand how legal norms operate within the social system. This 
point becomes crucial not only with regards to legal education directed 
at the training of lawyers, attorneys, judges, and notaries, but also 
when education is directed at training public officers called to work 
within public administration (both local and state administration, of 
course).  
 
We will see that these reflections on the careers mentioned above are 
quite widespread abroad, above all in the Northern American context. 
The situation is different with regards to administrative careers, 
although the problems in this field are just as relevant. Indeed, within 
administrative organisations we very often find violations of gender 
rights and freedoms deriving from various types of behaviour that can 
be described as gender bullying, sexual harassment and gender 
discrimination. Additionally, the limits for women in the taking on top 
positions are especially serious now. 
 
                                                            
21 As it was written already in 1987, “Most discussions on legal education do not see 
the question of what is theoretical and what is practical as a problem. […] The issue, 
or them, is how to strike the balance between the theoretical and the practical. 
Those who favor more practice argue that the balance has been struck too far in 
favor of theory; those who favor more theory argue that legal education is too 
professional or practical at the expense of the theory, The point is that all strongly 
depends from how we choose to define the terms”, see M Spiegel, ‘Theory and 
Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Legal Education’, (1987) 34 UCLA 
Law Review 578. Some Authors, for instance, criticise the linear connection 
between practical education and clinics, stating that “Clinical education can be a 
methodology similar to the case method, or it can be an exploration of theory 
borrowed from other disciplines similar to legal realism. Clinical education can be 
considered either theory or practice in the same way that the case method and legal 
realism can be either. That is, the characterization can be determined more by what 
features are emphasized and by the perspective of the person answering the 
question than by the object of the question”, (Spiegel, 594). 
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 Historical perspective in legal education 2.
Now we aim at underlining some more specific aspects with regards to 
the question of the ‘historisation’ of legal studies, and the point of the 
empirical approach to them. 
 
From one point of view, scholars have emphasised the need to rethink 
the dominant narratives of legal history and the role of the law and 
gender in producing and reflecting cultural and social norms, because 
gender methodology could overturn some of the current basic 
assumptions about citizenship, law, the state and nation building.22 
 
This methodological use of gender presupposes a consideration of 
gender as something different from a mere substitute for the biological 
category of ‘woman’: in these reconstructions gender becomes a 
producer of hierarchies, of deep-rooted structures of power. This 
means that, according to the reflections of some respected authors23, 
gender is certainly one way through which power becomes legitimised. 
Thinking about the relationships between the evolution of institutions 
and systems of power, the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and gender issues, we realise that the historical reading of 
many institutional passages and could benefit from an attention to the 
gender profile. 
 
A very interesting example, drawn from American legal history 24 
regards the well-known Dawes Act, adopted by Congress in 1887, by 
which Congress authorized the President of the United States to 
survey American Indian tribal land and divide it into lots for individual 
Indians. Those who accepted a lot and lived separately from the tribe 
would be granted United States citizenship. This Act broke up Native 
American Land and conveyed it to individual families, which were 
presumed to be headed by men. Cott demonstrates how legislative 
interventions like this one were related to marriage and were 
profoundly based on gender. The federal legislators sought to 
transform immigrant families into acceptable male-headed households, 
and did this by way of an immigration law that allowed only certain 
                                                            
22 F Batlan, ‘Engendering Legal History’ [2005] Law & Social Inquiry 823. 
23 J W Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, (1986) 91 The 
American Historical Review 1053. 
24 N Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Harvard University Press 
2000). 
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types of marriage. Quoting Cott, ‘the creation of the Nation passes just 
through the enforcement of male headed household’.25 Nation building 
and the subordination of women are two sides of the coin that 
represent the cultural reinforcement of consolidated systems of powers 
and relationships. 
 
We can also mention the common law institute of ‘coverture’ 
establishing that upon marriage women’s legal rights and obligations 
were subsumed by those of her husband, in accordance with the 
particular and diminished status of woman: this was enshrined in 
common law jurisdictions for several centuries and throughout most of 
the 19th century, creating wives as dependents of men, and affirming 
men's status and power over women.  
Another significant example of the role of law in creating and 
reflecting separate male and female spheres in society is represented 
by the notorious case of Bradwell v Illinois.26  In this case, the US 
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
prohibit a state from denying a woman admission to the legal bar. 
Concurring, Bradley wrote that: 
 
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognised... the respective 
spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be 
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many 
of the occupations of civil life. 
 
He added that the ‘destiny and nature of woman is to fulfil the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother’. At about the same date, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the qualities of womanhood ‘are 
surely not qualifications for forensic strife’. 
  
In ways like this, the law not only treated men and women differently, 
but also ‘naturalised’ distinct spheres for them, even by means of the 
rules of contract, labour and familial relationships. 27 Moreover, the 
results of the Bradwell case not only reflect gender asymmetries but 
also give important ideas about the discriminatory nature of legal 
education, where a woman cannot be considered as a possible 
                                                            
25 Ibid, 28. 
26 83 US 130 (1873). 
27 D Polan, ‘Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy,’ in D Kairys (ed), The Politics of 
Law: a Progressive Critique (Basic Books 1998). 
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recipient of knowledge and training because of the intrinsic ‘male’ 
nature of law and its practice. 
 
Furthermore, although in both domestic relationships and family law, 
issues of women and gender are easily seen, scholars some years ago 
began to find gender in areas of law that are apparently unrelated to 
gender, such as tort law and railroad accidents.28 It is really amazing to 
observe how, in so many cases, women have been ‘presumed 
incompetent, governed by emotion rather than reason, and unable to 
fully comprehend danger’, and because of this kind of consideration 
women’s contributory negligence was excused by courts and juries. 
Working in some women’s favour from the point of view of their 
criminal liability, this standard, reducing a woman’s agency, 
contributed to crystallising and conveying the stereotype of a woman, 
and caused her enduring subordination. This mechanism looks 
somewhat like the present trend of the courts to define certain conduct 
as culturally based in order to reduce the corresponding criminal 
liability, but at the same time contributing to the stigmatization of that 
conduct as being conduct directly linked to a specific ethnic group or 
minority.29 The group benefits from the application of the cultural 
defence (or something similar), but this very application means that the 
group becomes entangled within the net represented by the values and 
characteristics ascribed to it by public powers (this is a case of the use 
of ‘state speech’ to create categories, minorities and classes.30 
 
Even civil law systems give us many examples of the inter-relationships 
between women, society and institutions, and of the relevance of the 
historical approach in legal studies. 
Looking at the case of Italy, we can recall the process of the (legal) 
unification of the codes after the Italian (political) unification, when 
the struggle amongst different forms of government resulted in a total 
defeat for women. The result was the new code that summed the worst 
                                                            
28  B Y Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad 
Revolution 1865-1920  (Cambridge University Press 2001). 
29  See the case of the Rom people, described in P Pannia, 'Grammatica di 
un'esclusione: I Rom sotto processo', (2014) Studi sulla questione criminale, 
forthcoming 
30  O Lee, ‘Classifying Acts: State Speech, Race, and Democracy’, (2001) 8(2) 
Constellation 187; in Italy, we can mention the recent case law concerning Roma 
people, Cass Pen, decision n. 29734, 04.05.2011; Cass Pen, decision n. 37638, 
15.06.2012. 
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solutions known in the Borbonic Code of the Two Sicilies (1819) and in 
the Savoy Code of the Realm of Sardinia, whilst there were other 
possible solutions, much more satisfactory, such as the Austrian Code 
(1811) that was in force in Lombardy and Veneto. 
 
The new Article 134 of the Code introduced the husband’s 
authorisation for all the acts that woman intended to carry out: women 
are treated just like incompetents. Married women cannot donate, 
transfer real estate, mortgage, cede or obtain assets, and so on and so 
forth, without the husband's authorisation. 
 
We do not focus on the political rights here, this being enough to form 
a completely separate paper, but only aim at underlining the interest in 
a study of legal history that uses gender as one of the points of view, 
maybe even the principal point. Moreover, it is particularly significant 
that, even after the adoption of the Italian Constitution, equality 
between men and women has not been completely achieved. 
Unfortunately the examples are very numerous, but here we focus on 
one of them, an example that is directly linked to the issue of legal 
education and to how it affects the actual behaviour of legal 
practitioners. 
 
A statute adopted in 1956 (n. 1441), regarding the participation of 
women in the administration of justice by the Italian First Degree 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals for minors, tried to answer the 
continual requests made by women’s associations and  movements for 
the entry of women into the judiciary system, to match what Article 51 
of the Constitution already provided (this provision has been modified 
and strengthened by the constitutional reform of 2003). This provision 
is certainly very weak, and the presumed weakness of women is itself 
codified insofar as Article 25 allows for a woman to be relieved from 
public office if she needs to provide for the necessities of her family. It 
is evident how much a statement like this can contribute to reinforcing 
the paternalistic vision that aims to protect women from engagements 
that are too difficult and that means substantially excluding them from 
socially relevant and important appointments.31 
 
In the period between 1951 and 1956, many judicial complaints were 
presented by women who wanted to demonstrate their willingness to 
                                                            
31A M Galoppini, Il lungo viaggio verso la parità (Zanichelli 1992). 
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acquire the right to administer justice. The courts evaded and gave no 
standing to the constitutional principle of equality, expressing 
positions that hark back to suggestions in the American case law 
mentioned above: men and women are not equal, by their very nature; 
some activities seem to be reserved by nature to men, some other 
activities to women. Public offices include functions that the supreme 
natural law and experience discern to be more appropriate for one sex 
or the other.32 
 
The closing speech of the General Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation 
is amazing in this respect: First, he quoted Ulpiano ‘Foeminae ab 
omnibus officiis civilis remotae sunt, et ideo nec iudices esse possunt nec 
magistratum gerere nec potulare’; then he ignored the Constitution, 
claiming that constitutional norms did not give useful support to the 
plaintiff, because they were general statements that evidently referred 
to parliamentary statutes directed at the regulation of specific institutes; 
and finally, he confessed that a woman has her most desirable mission 
above all within the family and that in motherhood she sparkles 
incomparably, but anyway, if she longs to become a judge, her request 
ought to be received by the legislator, and not by the courts. 
 
This last statement is an example of how the question of the overblown 
distinction in the Italian Constitution between ‘compulsory norms’ and 
‘programmatic norms’ (which were, of course, thought to be the most 
progressive) can be studied using the gender perspective as an 
impressive catalyst to demonstrate the political intention implicitly to 
abrogate innovative constitutional provisions. 
 
 Empirical approach v theoretical approach: Abstract and concrete 3.
ideas about including women in legal education 
The gender perspective on legal education has been a central topic in 
the American legal literature for several years. In its early stages the 
topic was monopolised by feminists, who most often argued for equal 
professional opportunities on the grounds that men and women are 
the same: women should have access to legal education because they 
have the same capabilities as men.33 
                                                            
32 Court of Appeal of Rome, 29.03.1952, in Foro it, 1952, II, 84 ff, confirmed by the 
Court of Cassation. 
33 D L Rhode, ‘Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education’ (1992-
1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1547. 
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Over the last two decades the concept of sameness has been replaced 
by the aim of exploring and empowering difference, moving towards 
the evaluation of gender skills and concerns that are generally absent 
from legal education programmes, and leaving in the background the 
issue of women’s presence in law schools and law departments (which, 
anyway, has not yet been much investigated). Feminist critiques 
proceed on the two levels of inadequacies – those that directly concern 
gender (first of all, the indifference to gender issues in standard 
courses and texts), and those that raise basic doubts and challenges to 
the general organisation of legal education.  
 
From the first point of view, many scholars within feminist literature 
argue that the educational milieu is a microcosm that reflects, 
reinforces, and reproduces asymmetrical gender relations. 34  In 
particular, it has been underlined how the law school curriculum 
continues to marginalise or even to withhold issues of concern and 
interest to women, which are absent from legal studies in a very 
significant way).35 It would be simple to transfer American critiques 
that directly concern gender to the Italian educational context, with 
much more relevance given to the under-representation of women in 
positions of greatest academic reward, security and influence36 and to 
the lack of interest in issues of gender in standard courses and texts; 
and with less relevance to the existence of sexually harassing and 
demeaning conduct and the devaluation of women’s classroom 
participation (but only because of the reasons that we will underline 
below concerning the general structure of legal education, where 
participation in the classroom receives a very small endorsement 
particularly in basic courses). 
From the second point of view, a milestone is represented by Gilligan’s 
distinction between an ethics of rights and an ethics of care. 37 
                                                            
34 L Amede Obiora ‘Neither Here nor There: of the Female in American Legal 
Education’ (1996) 21 Law and Social Inquiry 355. 
35 N Erickson, ‘Sex Bias in Law Course: Some Common Issues’, (1988) 38 Journal of 
Legal Education 101; and N Erickson ‘Legal Education: The Last Academic Bastion 
of Sex-Bias?’, (1988) 10 Nova Law Review 457. 
36 We think here, for instance, of the research into women’s presence in the highest 
posts in universities, led by R Frattini and P Rossi, Report on Women at the Italian 
University, <http://www.df.unipi.it/~rossi/RossiFrattini.pdf> accessed 05.12.2014. 
37 C Gilligan, In a different voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Harvard University Press 1982), see also MF Belenky, B McVicker Clinchy, N Rule 
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According to Gilligan’s perspective, the ethics of care is very distant 
from legal studies, and this fact strongly hinges on the abstract attitude 
of legal education, which rarely translates general principles and rules 
into concrete cases and life situations to be faced and solved.  
 
Whether the distinction between an ethics of care and an ethics of 
rights is useful for women is another sensitive issue. Some scholars 
have claimed that this dichotomy is not authentic and is at the same 
time derived from and reinforcing the subordinate status of women38, 
particularly because it neglects considerations of race and ethnicity, 
culture, class, consciousness and all the features that are likely to 
mediate the ‘voice’ by which individuals express themselves. 
 
Other scholars have found that the shared experience of institutional 
oppression and/or racial stratification that informs the construction of 
self and the formation of identity amongst men and women in specific 
communities produces a convergence in the vocabulary of rights, 
morality, and social good. 39  Some suggestions in the literature 
underline the fact that what relational feminists identify as 
characteristically feminine (versus masculine) personalities, ontologies, 
epistemologies, and worldviews bears a remarkable resemblance to 
what other cultures categorise as non-Western (versus Western) 
personalities and worldviews.40 
 
It is evident that theory and practice also affect the methodology of the 
consideration of women in legal education, and the corresponding 
instruments. It is just the comparison between theory and practice that 
shows that ‘what most feminists want from legal education looks much 
like what other informed critics have wanted’41, and that: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Goldberger, and J Mattuck Tarule., Women’s Ways of Knowing (Basic Books 1986); S 
Ruddick Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Beacon Press 1989); and N 
Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984). 
38 CA MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on life and law (Harvard College 
1987). 
39  CB Stack, ‘Different Voices, Different Visions: Gender, Culture and Moral 
Reasoning’ in M Zinn, B Dill (eds), Women of Color in U.S. Society (Temple University 
Press 1994). 
40 S Harding, ‘The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory’ in MR 
Malson, JF O’Barr, S Westphal-Wihl and M Wyer (eds), Feminist Theory in Practice 
and Process (University of Chicago Press 1991). 
41 DL Rhode, ‘Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education’ (1992-
1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1548. 
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obvious examples include the call by realists and clinicians for law 
schools that focus more on practical lawyering skills; the demands by 
humanists and critical theorists for less hierarchical and less 
authoritarian teaching techniques; the argument of law and society 
leaders for more contextual analysis and interdisciplinary teaching 
materials.42 
 
The comparison between theory and practice confirms that the 
traditional law school format assumes that learning is a rational, largely 
unidirectional process; that professors try to transmit knowledge about 
what law is and does through reasoned discourse; and that at the end 
students attempt to replay this account in their final exams.43 All these 
features seem to allow an appreciation of the theoretical framework 
built by Gilligan. 
 
We do not know whether only women reason in a ‘different voice’, are 
less likely to privilege abstract rights over concrete relationships, and 
are more attentive to values of care, connection, and context.44 In any 
case, this ‘different voice’ certainly exists, and could bring a distinctive 
perspective to the resolution of human problems, one that is silenced 
by the ‘competitive, combative, and a contextual structure of legal 
education’. 45  On this point we need to distinguish between the 
common law context and the civil law context. In the US a substantial 
problem is that the educational structure at most law schools 
strengthens students’ competitive capacity to the exclusion of other 
attributes, particularly because of the dynamics that characterise the 
relationships within the classrooms. These considerations are not 
applicable to the Italian legal educational system, where the less 
interactive method of teaching makes it impossible to favour rational 
and competitive men over empathetic and prismatic women.  
 
However, just because there is a need for greater concreteness in legal 
education, which is hardly present in the Italian system, there ought to 
be a common commitment to more co-operative and empathetic 
training, and this would affect academic structures and content in 
                                                            
42 Ibid, 1552. 
43 SH Williams, ‘Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method’, 
(1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1571. 
44C Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, op cit. 
45 DL Rhode, op cit. 
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various ways. In terms of academic structure, a special emphasis would 
be given to legal clinics, simulations and other settings for interactive, 
experimental learning. Collaborative projects and the development of 
interpersonal skills would occupy a more central role in standard 
courses and evaluation processes. In terms of content (which is what 
we are going to investigate in the next section) dimensions such as 
gender, race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation would become 
more central categories in the analysis of legal institutions, the 
protection of rights and the organization of power.  
 
Legal education would not simply need to acknowledge the differences, 
but would need to have an exploration of the processes that give rise to 
the social meaning and consequences of those differences.46 
 
In Italy, another aspect to be underlined regards the management of 
the ‘Scuola per la magistratura’ (a new school for the judiciary), which 
was recently created by a governmental decree, n 26/2006 and 
effectively began in 2012. Not only is the number of women on the 
executive committee definitely small (two out of twelve), but also, from 
the point of view of content, there are very few lessons on gender 
issues or issues even partially linked to gender. Analysing the 
curriculum in 2013, the continuing education only includes a lesson on 
criminal protection against stalking and bullying (and, furthermore, 
this is supplied by e-learning). Considering that basic legal education is 
not ‘genderised’, the absence of gender issues and a gender 
perspective in specialised training is much graver. 
 
This reflection on content is particularly significant, and we will take it 
into consideration in the next section. For now, it is important to 
remind ourselves that the very approach to the law should change, 
considering that (for historical reasons) the law presupposes a mythical 
creature: a coherent, rational legal subject, capable of freely choosing 
and consenting to a wide range of options and capable, under normal 
circumstances, of being considered totally responsible for its actions.47 
Indeed, in Europe as in the US, the legal subject is modelled on a 
                                                            
46B Ong Hing, ‘Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, 
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses’ 
(1992-1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1807. 
47  MV Rodriguez, ‘Pedagogy in Law: Ideas for Integrating Gender Into Legal 
Education’ [1998-1999] American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and the 
Law 267 
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white, heterosexual, middle to upper class male with no disability. He 
is the male bourgeois landowner whom we find in the Napoleonic Civil 




First of all, if it is not already evident, why should a feminist legal 
curriculum or gender courses, be introduced? 
 
In Italy, until now, the terminological issue has found no place, 
because there is no experience that could be ascribed to the 
‘genderisation’ of legal education that we have been talking about. Our 
investigation reveals that the only current course on ‘Law and Gender’ 
is an optional course at the University of Trento that is taught by 
professors of private comparative law. Of course, we do not consider as 
relevant to our investigation all the (existing) courses on gender (from 
an anthropological, historical, philosophical and sociological 
perspective) that are included in programmes that, even when they can 
be followed in law departments, are not directed at training students to 
become attorneys, prosecutors, judges and notaries. We mean that the 
field of our analysis is specifically the role of gender in legal curricula – 
curricula that lead to the participation in public examinations from 
which the professionals mentioned above are selected.  
 
An English expert scholar has underlined three basic reasons that 
make gender and feminist studies necessary in the field of legal 
studies.49 Firstly, there is the high number of women amongst law 
students and practitioners. In the United Kingdom (where the paper 
was written) more than half of all law students and more than half of all 
entrants to the legal profession are women. The data is quite similar in 
Italy, and, in any case, more than half the population of the world are 
women. This quantitative element ought to be reflected in legal 
curricula, starting with the breaking of the traditional distinction 
                                                            
48 M Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, (Belknap Pr 2007). Critiques towards 
contractualism from the point of view of feminism are clearly expressed in C 
Pateman, Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press 1988), where she underlines 
that ‘In contract theory universal freedom is always a hypothesis, a story, a political 
fiction. Contract always generates political right in the forms of domination and 
subordination’, above all against women. 
49R Auchmuty, ‘Agenda for a Feminist Legal Curriculum in Legal Studies’, (2003) 3 
Legal Studies 23. 
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between compulsory and optional subjects that marginalises matters 
that are central to the growth of gender consciousness: family law 
(always optional), and women’s legal history (which is definitely not 
taught, even within the context of general legal history, where an 
inclusion of the gender perspective would be preferable). 
 
The effect of this absence is strongly seen in the lack of a female 
perspective in many judgments in which such a perspective would be 
significant for the resolution of the concrete case. The female 
perspective seems to be very hard to achieve, because there is a 
complete overlap between the perspective of men and the perspective 
of the law. 
 
The second reason is the relevance given in our legal systems to the 
equality principle:  
 
It is in the law school that the values, ethics and principles of the law 
and the legal profession are first introduced, developed and inculcated. 
And, it is the law students of today who will become the lawyers, 
academics and judges of tomorrow and who will, therefore, exert a 
considerable influence on both the role and status of women lawyers, 
and on the ways in which the law itself interacts with women’s lives.50  
 
This claim perfectly illustrates the relationship between gender, 
equality, law and justice. 
The third reason concerns the fact that while discrimination varies 
between countries, peoples, geographic places and cultures, ‘evidence 
of the continued global oppression of women remains overwhelming’.51 
This evidence should be challenged by the law, which we believe is the 
social weapon called on to eradicate women's subordination and to 
give full implementation to the equality principle. 
 
After we have considered all these points, at the end of this section we 
have to focus on possible proposals. The question is how gender can 
be integrated into legal education. What strategies can render legal 
education more able to develop public awareness of the role of gender 
in social relationships and dynamics of power, and to produce legal 
                                                            
50C McGlynn The Woman Lawyer: Making the Difference (Butterworths 1998), 27. 
51J Conaghan ‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (2000) 27 
Journal of Legal Studies 354. 
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professionals who would make gender relevant in the recognition and 
protection of rights? 
 
Feminist legal theorists propose three methods.52 The first method is 
‘the woman’s question’: this means that students should be called to 
identify the gender implications of rules and practices that appear to 
be neutral and objective. The second is practical feminist reasoning: 
this reasoning consists in posing open-ended questions about concrete 
issues in order to determine both the possible solution and the 
problem that is actually found in the situation under consideration. In 
this way students can identify different points of view and perspectives 
that may be far from the systems of values prevailing in society. The 
third method is the raising of consciousness, which can be interpreted 
as an interactive and cooperative process in which women share and 
compare their personal experiences.53 
 
All these ‘gender factors’, useful for building a different methodology, 
are reinforced by giving a special role to legal clinics54, where students 
are asked to offer pro bono assistance in cases with a high public 
                                                            
52K Barlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’, in K Barlett and R Kennedy (eds) Feminist 
Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Westview Press 1991). 
53K Barlett, ibid. 
54In Italy only three legal clinics have been launched in the last years. The first 
optional course in Legal Clinic started at the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Brescia, during the academic year 2009/2010, as an experiment. It was promoted by 
a group of legal scholars engaged in innovative teaching methodologies within the 
field of legal education and it was led in collaboration with very important American 
Legal Clinics such as the ones operating at the Yale Law School, the New York 
University Law School, the CUNY Law School and the University of Connecticut 
Law School. The other two legal clinics operate at the University of Rome Tre and 
the University of Turin. 
At the University of Rome Tre was opened a public legal desk specialised in 
immigration and human rights, where people offer concrete cases to be analysed 
and treated by young legal students who render legal assistance to disadvantaged 
persons. Small groups of students, supervised by law professors and lawyers, follow 
the cases and participate to the judicial hearings, although they cannot legally 
represent their assisted. Generally, the cases are recommended by associations, 
labor unions and religious charity organisations.  
Even the University of Turin opened in 2013/2014 a legal clinic in ‘Person and 
family’, where students could deepen their knowledge of family law and protection 
for ‘weak adults’ through this new methodological approach. The Law Department 
has made an active participation in the course has been made equal to having 
passed the exam in family law. 
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impact, such as those that expose unconstitutional practices or the 
systematic subordination of and discrimination against women. It is 
important that students work on cases that demonstrate the role of the 
law in changing society, beliefs and conventional wisdom. 
 
Recently, the roadmap for integration has been presented in four steps: 
the inclusion in legal departments, faculties and law schools (to which, 
in Italy, we could certainly add the ‘Scuola di magistratura’ mentioned 
above) of instruments like a gender audit, self-assessment exercises or 
a gender needs assessment; the sensitisation of gender terminology; 
the inclusion of exercises for confronting stereotypes, through the 
students writing a story on a gender value conflict (real or hypothetical) 
and then analysing and discussing the stories; and the integration of 
gender and anti-discrimination courses and modules into the 
curricula.55 
 
The role of the practical approach becomes much more evident when 
we think about some of the recent Italian provisions that we 
considered in the previous paragraphs, such as those concerning 
‘femminicidio’ or political representation and quotas.  
 
Our first main point is that if there is the possibility for legal students 
to have direct experience of concrete cases concerning gender violence, 
and to employ theoretical instruments in order to guarantee the wider 
protection of women's fundamental rights and freedom, then this 
could produce legal practitioners in the future who have a gender 
consciousness. This feature is crucial, above all, for some professionals, 
such as police officers, and in the exercise of general public safety 
functions. Many studies have underlined how the intrinsic elbow room 
that characterises law enforcement risks working to the detriment of 
women and minorities. As an example, domestic violence is still 
considered by police officers as an ‘unproductive, messy and not real’ 
field of work.56 Police officers, although they often have to intervene in 
this kind of crime, also tend to manage them outside the roadmaps and 
instruments provided by the criminal procedure code, even when 
                                                            
55 OL Odigie-Emmanuel, ‘Gender and Racial Issues in Legal Education: Law as 
Mechanism for Social Control’ (2013) Global Alliance for Justice Education 
conference, Jindal Global Law School, < www.gaje.org/conferences/7th-worldwide-
conference/> accessed 10.12.2014. 
56 R Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Oxford 2010), 172 
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violence is evident. Another problematic feature concerns the 
treatment of women who have suffered rape: many sociological and 
criminological studies have underlined an insensitive and sometimes 
hostile attitude by some police officers. Clearly, the basic level of the 
services of law and order is performed by people who have not had 
legal training, and very often they do not have a Master’s degree in law, 
but those at the higher level of command and control have received an 
academic education, usually in law. These managers should therefore 
have the responsibility of organising training programmes for their 
subordinates that include gender topics, and they need to be well 
aware of the issue in order to be proactive and undertake the necessary 
measures.  
 
Our second point is that the habit of considering the participation of 
women in politics, and more generally in society, in work and in the 
‘free marketplace of ideas’, desires and ambitions, as essential and 
undeniable to be needs to be built through a long training process, 
where a fundamental role is played by legal education. An education 
based firmly on affirmative action and substantial equality would 
improve the capacity of students (and future legal practitioners) to 
recognise the need for public interventions to promote and guarantee a 
female presence in political institutions and governments and in all 
places where crucial decisions are taken. And it would prevent, for the 
future, legal scholars from making (sometimes) unintentional 
references to the principle of equality in such a way that limits 
women’s rights while formally pretending to guarantee equal treatment 
for men and women, starting from the misleading presupposition that 
parity between men and women has been achieved. 
 
Of course, the educational approach chosen in this paper also reminds 
us of the importance of a continuing legal education that connects the 
boundaries of law schools and departments to the judicial environment 
which, for instance, is recognised by legal doctrine as a fundamental 
agent of change.57  
 
                                                            
57 L Armytage, ‘Judicial Education on Equality’ (1995) 58 (2) Modern Law Review 160 
underlines how the US model of judicial education focuses on the role of attitudes 
and values in judicial decision making, supported by examples relating to a range of 
disability types. 
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We cannot spend time on the first point, as that would require a 
specific investigation. Instead, we dedicate the final reflections of this 
third section to the legal curriculum and how it might be modified in 
order to pursue the goals set out in this paper. 
 
The appropriate consideration from which we want to start seems very 
obvious: the effect of designating some subjects as compulsory and 
others as merely optional is naturally to depreciate the latter subjects. 
A worse case is, of course, the absence of a subject from the 
curriculum, which is what happens in the case of Gender and Law. 
Anyway, looking at the Italian context, the Master’s degree in law 
needs a broadly-based compulsory curriculum that includes subjects 
like family law (which is currently optional), women’s legal history, and 
courses on gender, race and sexuality perspectives; this would 
encourage a study of law that started from the person and not from the 
legal category.58 This approach to radical topics and perspectives would 
promote a different way of thinking in students (especially in the 
excellent students who are now chiefly relegated to a passive and often 
mnemonic learning of legal categories, notions and case law): a critical, 
empathetic reasoning that will allow students to acquire 
methodological skills that they will able to apply across their studies 
and in future research and legal activities. 
 
Transforming the curriculum also means another basic thing: adding a 
few subjects that are considered to be particularly close to women 
because of their content and their specific topics would not be 
sufficient to change the general structure of legal education, and the 
way the compulsory subjects are delivered. 
 
Every subject ought to be delivered through a binary approach: after 
students have learned the positive law and statutes, legal doctrine and 
case law, in the way that is particular to the various disciplines, they 
ought to be asked to consider the law from other standpoints, learning 
to do so from their professors, who should show them how cultural 
diversity and inclusiveness can affect the reading of law, of rules, and 
of decisions.59 
                                                            
58See the considerations of R Auchmuty, ‘Agenda for a Feminist Legal Curriculum 
in Legal Studies’, (2003) 3 Legal Studies 23. 
59NKS Banks, ‘Pedagogy and Ideology: Teaching Law as if it Really Matters’ (1999) 19 
Legal Studies 450. 
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 CONCLUDING REMARKS IV.
 
In this paper we have described the necessity of a deep reflection on 
the inclusion of gender issues, and above all gender perspective, in 
legal education. We have described criticalities and already existing 
experiences, and proposed some possible methodologies, paying 
attention to the relevant differences between civil law and common law 
systems of legal professions and training. 
 
Indeed, the predominant indifference towards considering gender as a 
legal matter, deserving time and space in legal programmes, seems 
basically to need three interventions: (1) a cross teaching of gender 
topics in (existing) general courses; (2) the inclusion of gender topics 
within (existing) general courses on fundamental rights; and (3) specific 
courses on law and gender. 
 
The goal of social inclusion is particularly important within the 
perspective of this work, because it becomes much more relevant 
during the crises, when excluding policies prevail over the protection 
of social rights and over the achievement of equal opportunities. 
Studying gender equality and equal opportunities within a context of 
economic and social crisis serves to debunk the false perception that 
gender equality may be an important aim to achieve, but not in times 
of crisis when societies and governments should concentrate on 
creating economic growth.  
 
We believe, and have to demonstrate, that education has a strong role 
in influencing women’s choices for their future learning, working and 
building a social and professional status. Above all, we want to 
underline the role that legal education in particular assumes. It is a 
double role: from one side legal education represents the background 
and the training for the future lawyers, judges, public employees asked 
to give implementation and enforcement to fundamental rights and 
liberties, putting into effect gender equality and the recognition of 
subjectivities. Going even further, legal education constitutes an 
important channel of awareness even for lawmakers, that mainly come 
from schools of law: the endurance of gender biases and the limits in 
the legislative promotion of equal opportunities is telling from the lack 
of the gender perspective in legal curricula. 
